ABSTRACT：The Sah-Stiglitz "Economics of Price Scissors" model, concerning the political economy of price scissors, formulates the optimal terms of trade against peasants. In the present paper, by extending this model to an open economy and allowing agricultural rationing, we first check if the model stands up to China's data and, if so, we estimate its key structural parameters. Using province-level panel data from 1949-1992, we find that the importance of peasants in the government's objective function is less than the importance of workers. In addition, the importance of consumption is also less than that of investment. Such findings are consistent the reality in China.
Introduction
As introduced by Preobrahensky (1926) , the term of "price scissors" refers to how the government in a developing country, especially a socialist country, uses to extract pro…ts from peasants in the rural sector to subsidize workers in the urban sector. As a result, the government in this setting could increase capital accumulation using price scissors. Later, Sah and Stiglitz (1984) (henceforth S-S) proposed an elegant theoretical model to formalize the optimal terms of trade versus peasants by analyzing the government's social welfare function. Perhaps because of the paper's simple but powerful theoretical structure, it was quickly applied in a variety of subsequent theoretical analysis. For instance, Carter (1986) extended the S-S model from a closed-economy to an open-economy setup. Blomqvist (1986) examined the case of indirect taxation from agricultural goods in socialist countries.
These studies recognized that price scissors have been important in socialist countries such as former Soviet Union and China.
More importantly, traditional wisdom suggests that governments in socialist countries give more attention to investment than to consumption and more weight to workers than to peasants. However, this wisdom is a priori. In this study, we investigate if the view is borne out by China's data. And, if so, to what extent the government favors urban workers over rural peasants and future investment over current consumption.
We develop a theoretical setup based on the S-S (1984) model. To explore the optimal terms of trade versus peasants, the S-S model (1984) used the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function to assign a relative weight between current consumption and capital 1 accumulation. In addition, welfare from both workers and peasants is equivalent in the mind of the social planner. Such a simpli…cation is helpful for us to estimate two relative weights: the weight of current consumption relative to future investment and the weight of peasants relative to workers.
We estimate related structural parameters to investigate the relative importance of agricultural and industrial sectors and the relative importance of investment and consumption in the social planner's mind by using China's province-level panel data from 1949-1992, during which China used central planning. We tailor and extend the S-S's (1984) theoretical model to …t the case of China by allowing international trade and agricultural rationing. Indeed, China had a low openness ratio but it had never actually been a closed economy even before its economic reforms began in 1978. 1 Moreover, di¤erent from S-S (1984) by restricting the weight of welfare between peasants and workers, we allow the model to demonstrate its own ‡exibility and let data predict the model's magnitude.
In line with S-S, we maintain the relative weight between consumption and investment to measure the social value of marginal investment.
In this paper, we also estimate the relative agricultural price elasticity of wages since such data, though essential, are unavailable for our key structural estimations of the relative weight between current consumption and future investment. The estimations of such elasticities may certainly su¤er from the usual measurement error problem due to data unavailability, or they may be sensitive to di¤erent estimation methods. It is possible such 1 As pointed out by Naughton (2005) , before 1979, China's total trade/GDP ratio was around 10%. It reached its minimum level of 5% in 1970-1971. 2 measurement errors might create an endogeneity problem for our structural estimations.
We therefore address this problem by using appropriate instrumental variables.
So that our empirical speci…cation is close to reality, we also add an extra variable, the famine dummy, in the estimations and test whether it adds explanatory power to our theoretical model. China su¤ered a nation-wide famine during 1958 -1961 wisdom suggests that such a negative shock would a¤ect the relative weights of the government's objective function. We therefore add a variable to check this traditional belief.
The economic rationale is that, if such a variable adds extra explanatory power to our theoretical model, this could be an indication that our theoretical setup is incomplete, therefore suggesting an extension to the theoretical model for better empirical …t.
Our paper joins a small collection of the related papers. Remarkably, very few studies have conducted empirical investigations of the price scissors although the S-S (1984) model makes clear-cut empirical predictions. One exception is Li and Tsui (1990) . Di¤erent from other theoretical studies that treat the former Soviet Union as the work-horse, they use China as their sample of a developing country to test the Preobrazhensky's First Proposition that price scissors can help a country to extract an industrial surplus for capital accumulation. They …nd evidence that the relative agricultural price is positively correlated with the capital accumulation. They then explain this unexpected result using the e¢ ciency wage hypothesis. Knight (1995 Knight ( , 1999 provides some interesting …ndings on the rural-urban divide in China by analyzing changes in various o¤er curves.
Our …ndings are important because we are able to retrieve the relative magnitude of consumption and investment in the government's objective function of China. In addition, 3 we also calculate the weight of workers versus that of peasants. Our estimates suggest that the weight of peasants is smaller than that of workers, and the weight of consumption is much smaller than that of investment. Such …ndings are consistent with China'reality.
Hence, our analysis explains China's behavior during its planned-economy era quite well.
One potential limitation of our current approach is that we do not have feasible data on China's disaggregated province-level agricultural trade before 1978. To explore the e¤ects of price scissors on agricultural trade, it therefore is essential to run regressions using panel data. Unfortunately, we cannot access such data from before China's economic reforms.
Inspired by the gravity model in trade theory, we therefore seek to estimate the share of manufacturing trade relative to the full trade volume by allowing heterogeneous foreign demand behavior across provinces.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces on price scissors in the context of China. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework based on the S-S model. Section 4 speci…es the econometric methods. Section 5 describes the data, presents the empirical …ndings, and checks their robustness. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Price Scissors in China
Before the economic reforms, the prices of all commodities in China were set by the government. As pointed out by Lin (2003 Lin ( , 2005 Lin ( , 2007 , China, like many other lessdeveloped countries (LDC), adopted a heavy-industry-oriented development strategy after gaining its political independence in 1949. Heavy industries were capital intensive. The projects in heavy industries required huge capital inputs and long gestation. However, China was a capital-scarce agrarian economy at that time. Moreover, China's political leaders also emphasized the importance of self-reliance to raise such capital. Therefore, the only way left to the government was to squeeze the agricultural surplus for investments in heavy industries by lowering agricultural prices paid to peasants for their products while raising the prices of industrial products sold to peasants. In a nutshell, under this strategy, it was natural for the government to use price scissors against peasants in favor of industrial development. Figure 1 helps us to understand the essence of price scissors. Without the government's intervention, the relative price for agricultural products is determined by the market directly and yields (p A =p I ) 0 . To squeeze bene…ts out of peasants for its future investment, the government sets a lower relative price (p A =p I ) 1 for agricultural goods, which yields an excess demand for agricultural goods. In the absence of price adjustments, the government has to import agricultural goods to meet the demand. But this was infeasible since China had scarce foreign reserves in this period. Therefore, the only way left to the government was that it had to ration its agricultural goods. Put another way, the demand curve is regulated to be a vertical. By rationing agricultural goods, not only did the government not have to import agricultural goods but it could also export its agricultural goods to create foreign reserves.
[Insert Figure 1 Here] Following previous works like Lardy (1983) , we de…ne price scissors (p) as the relative ratio between the purchasing price index of farm products (p A ) and the rural retail price 5 index of industrial products (p I ). That is, p p A =p I . 2 Figure 2 shows that the relative price index for agricultural goods increases over these years. 3 However, such an increase is not fully attributable to the price scissors against peasants since prices of all commodities were not completely set by the government after 1984. 4 [Insert Figure 2 Here] China began its economic reforms in 1978. Instead of adopting shock therapy, China implemented dual-track gradual reforms in its transition to a market economy. As discussed by Lin, Cai, and Li (1996) , such a dual-track price system includes two stages. In the …rst stage, from 1978 to 1984, the government merely focused on adjusting agricultural prices relative to industrial prices.
In contrast, in the second stage, from 1985 to 1992, the government aimed at introducing a market track parallel to the planned track. In this stage, some key commodities were still included in various state plans. The prices for these commodities were set by the government just as before the economic reforms. The prices of the commodities excluded from the state plans were directly determined by the market. Accordingly, there were three types of prices setting during this stage: …xed state-regulated prices, state-guided prices, and market-determined prices. In particular, in 1992, when China's government 2 As discussed by Li and Tsui (1990) , the price ratio could also be measured by an alternative index, pA=pI , wherepI is the ex-factory price index of industrial goods. In this paper, we measure the price scissors using the pA=pI index since there are data missing in the alternative index. 3 As shown in Figure 2 , there was a jump in the purchasing price index of farm products (PPIFP) during 1959-1961 due to the great famine. 4 Note that the relative agricultural price ratios are higher than one. However, this does not imply that the agricultural price level is higher than the industrial price level since various price indices are calculated using the Laspeyres formula.
6 o¢ cially adopted its market economy, the weights of both …xed state-regulated prices and state-guided prices accounted for only 7:1% of the entire economy. This decreased to less than 5% in 1999. Put another way, 95% of all commodity prices were determined by market forces by 1999. 5 
The Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical model is based on the S-S (1984) model. To …t our model to China's case, we extend the S-S model by allowing both international trade and agricultural rationing.
In addition, consumers'utility functions in the S-S (1984) model are also modi…ed to be suitable for empirical estimations.
In our model, the economy consists of two sectors, the rural with population N a and the urban with population N m . People are sector-immobile but have identical utility functions. Foe ease of estimation, we specify a quasi-linear utility in the S-S (1984) model:
where consumer j is from either the agricultural sector (a) or the urban manufacturing sector (m). The sub-utility function is, as usual, increasing and di¤erentiable with x j .
Consumer j's consumption of manufacturing good y serves as the numeraire. Therefore, all wealth e¤ects are absorbed into the manufacturing sector, in the sense that agricultural goods are necessities, whereas manufacturing goods are not necessarily necessities.
The industrial sector uses two factors, capital (K) and labor (L m ), to produce man- A representative peasant with a utility function (1) faces a budget constraint as follows:
where X is his/her agricultural production. The per capita land endowment is R=N a since land areas are assumed to be evenly allocated among peasants in China. Accordingly, the representative peasant's indirect utility function, V a , is:
From the envelope theorem, we have:
where the residual rural surplus, S a , is de…ned as X x a . Similarly, the wage rate (w), which is set by the government, is the unique source of income for urban workers. 6 This suggests that the budget constraint for a representative urban worker is as follows:
6 Note that workers in China did not have capital endowment explicitly. According to China's constitution, all capital endowments belonged directly to the state.
8
The representative worker also faces another constraint on agricultural rationing. That is,
where x m is the ration for per capita urban agricultural consumption. Therefore, we obtain:
Di¤erent from the S-S (1984) model, we allow the country to have some foreign trade (Carter, 1986) . At the very least, China was never a closed economy after 1949. Even before its economic reforms in 1978, it traded with some other socialist countries by exporting agricultural products (Naughton, 2005) . Given the depressed agricultural relative price, one would expect countries like China that adopted price scissors to import agricultural products to balance the excess demand. However, the government in China imposed rationing on agricultural goods among urban workers. Therefore, the balanced equation for agricultural goods is:
where E is agricultural exports. Due to agricultural rationing, China actually exported its agricultural goods, despite domestic demand.
The government exported agricultural goods at a given global price (p w ), which was higher than the domestic agricultural price due to the arti…cial price depression at home.
The markup ( p w p) was collected as a part of the government surplus. Therefore, we have governmental surplus (G) as follows:
That is, the government obtained a surplus from two sources: the industrial surplus and net agricultural trade surplus. The industrial surplus is measured by the pro…t retained in the industrial sector. The last term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of (9) is the agricultural trade surplus. Di¤erent from usual setups in the trade literature to specify the tari¤-like markup as a function of the domestic price, the di¤erence between domestic prices and the rest of the world is random and irregular since the domestic price was set by the government arbitrarily. 7 The government maximizes its aggregate welfare by choosing the optimal relative price.
Following the S-S (1984) model, the government has the following objective function:
The …rst term on the RHS of (10) consumption and it also favored urban workers over rural peasants. However, these are a priori assumptions. Our main interest in this paper is to estimate the two weights, and , in the government's objective function.
By substituting (9) into (10), we obtain:
To determine the optimal terms of trade relative to peasants, we take the partial derivative of the government's social welfare function, , with respect to p, and set it zero:
By algebraic manipulation as shown in Appendix A, we obtain the equilibrium condition as follows:
Note that the …rst term of (13), pE, is agricultural exports. The second term, pN m x m , is aggregate agricultural urban consumption with rationing, which is observable from the data. Included in the last term, N m wL m , is aggregate urban wages, and is the wage elasticity with respect to the relative price of agricultural goods, which is de…ned as (dw=dp) p=w.
The Econometric Model
Equation (13) sheds light on the essence of our empirical speci…cation. The provincial governments are expected to have the same government objective function as the central authority since, under the planed economy system in China, all local governments are strictly monitored and controlled by the central government. Hence, our empirical speci…-cation relies on a province-level panel data set. However, there is no particular directional guidance for the inclusion of an error term in the econometric model. We …rst consider a speci…cation as follows:
where the regressand is the agricultural urban consumption under rationing (C pN m x m ).
It is mainly a¤ected by agricultural exports (A pE), urban wages (W N m wL m ), and the relative agricultural price elasticity of wages ( ). The subscript i indicates the province and t indicates the year. The error term is considered like any other factor that a¤ects agricultural urban consumption but not considered in our theoretical model. It can be decomposed into three components: (1) province-speci…c …xed e¤ects, i ; which capture unobserved province-speci…c time-invariant …xed e¤ects; (2) year-speci…c timevariant …xed e¤ects, t ; and (3) an idiosyncratic e¤ect, it , with zero expectation and heteroskedastic variance, 2 i . Our main objective in the remainder of the paper is to estimate the two structural parameters,
[Insert Figure 3 Here] Without a doubt, such a speci…cation is not unique to estimating (12) . We could consider at least two other optional empirical speci…cations. The …rst is to move agricultural exports (A it ) to the left-hand-side (LHS). In this way, the other two variables, C it and W it , serve as regressors. Alternatively, we can also take the term W it as the regressand and put A it and C it on the RHS. Thus, it is natural to ask which speci…cation is the most suitable one. We adopt Speci…cation (14) for following reasons.
First, compared to the alternative speci…cation, which treats agricultural exports as the regressand, Speci…cation (14) allow us to dodge the di¢ culty of data unavailability.
As mentioned above, province-level agricultural trade data before 1978 are inaccessible.
A feasible way to address this challenge is to calculate an approximation by using information on province-level GDP and total output of the industrial sector, which is speci…ed shortly. However, such an approximation could su¤er from some measurement errors. In econometrics, there is nothing wrong with putting it on the LHS since we could allow such a measurement error to be incorporated into the error term. But we still su¤er from the second problem: we do not have data on the price elasticity of wages on the RHS.
Any estimation or data approximation of this elasticity could create another source of measurement error on the RHS.
Similarly, we can make W it the regressand. Clearly, the measurement error of the calculated price elasticity would be passed through the error term. However, since we have no data on agricultural trade, the measurement error from the approximation of agricultural trade could easily cause our estimation to be biased. Hence, we avoid this approach and focus on Speci…cation (14) instead. 
Agricultural Export
To estimate (14), we need province-level agricultural export data. Unfortunately, such disaggregated trade data before 1978 are unavailable. We only have national-level data before 1978. To resolve this empirical challenge, we construct an approximation for the "true" province-level agricultural export data by using the gravity trade model.
The gravity equation in the trade model predicts that export volume is directly proportional to the exporter's GDP. This prediction holds at the disaggregated industry level and the province level (Helpman, 1987) . Put another way, province i's exports (T it ) are directly proportional to its output (Q it ). Therefore, we have T it = it Q it where it measures the share of foreign demand for province i's products in year t: 8 By the same token, the share of foreign demand for province i's manufacturing products is
where Q m it is province i 's output of manufacturing commodities at year t. Accordingly, we can construct a proxy for manufacturing exports given and manufacturing exports (M it ): A it = T it M it . 9 That is, agricultural exports are:
Note that we have data on Q m it , Q it , and T it . In contrast, the relative demand ratio, s m it , is left for estimation. 8 For example, if it = 1, then all province i's products are exported. Conversely, if it = 0; then province i exports no commodities. 9 Note that China's exports from the service sector were very small in the period 1949-1992 (Naughton,
Agricultural exports after 1978 were directly calculated by the di¤erence between province-level agricultural production and province-level agricultural consumption (i.e., urban plus rural). Note that we do not directly use foreign trade data since inter-province trade, which is taken into account after 1978, is allowable based on our setup. However, we are unable to do so before 1978 and we have found no signi…cant way to the estimates due to data restrictions.
Relative Agricultural Price Elasticity of Wage
There are three possible ways to obtain wage elasticity with respect to prices. The …rst is to use data from previous studies. To the best of our knowledge, very few studies, if
any, provide such elasticities over the years in this study. The second possible way is to calculate elasticities directly by de…nition, it [(dw=dp) p=w] it , which is technically feasible. However, this does not make sense economically. The elasticity should not be expected to vary across provinces given that each province in China rarely had autonomy under the central planning system. It also should not ‡uctuate frequently over the years since the main economic indicators and important economic policies were determined by …ve-year national plans. Therefore, the only way is to estimate the price elasticity of wages indirectly. We therefore consider a two-way, …xed-e¤ect speci…cation as follows:
where the estimated coe¢ cient,^ , is interpreted as the elasticity of wages with respect to relative prices of agricultural goods. As usual, the province-speci…c and year-speci…c …xed e¤ects control for other unspeci…ed factors. We could undoubtedly suspect that there are some measurement errors in this simple speci…cation. It may be a good benchmark speci…cation, but it is certainly noisy since we have no idea about the "true" speci…cation of a reduced-form estimation. In other words, the endogeneity issue caused by measurement errors may be a concern in (14) . Two-stage least square (TSLS) estimation is a powerful econometric method to control for endogeneity issues created by measurement errors. 10 We therefore address the endogeneity issue by adopting appropriate instruments.
However, it is reasonable to believe that such an elasticity should be di¤erent when the economy faces a structural change. We therefore estimate the elasticities by separating the entire period 1949-1992 into three sub-period, using 1978 and 1992 as the two cut-o¤ points. The results are reported in Table 2 .
Now, we combine (14) with (17) to derive the new equilibrium condition for the estimations:
To ease of the estimations, we presume that the relative demand ratio for manufacturing products is identical across provinces and years: s m it = s m . One might suspect that such a simpli…cation could cause some bias since China's trade pattern before 1978
was di¤erent from that after 1978. Before 1978, China exported almost only agricultural commodities. We therefore add an indicator, I t , (which equals one after 1978 and zero otherwise) into the empirical speci…cation as follows:
1 0 Wooldridge (2002, chapter 5) provides a careful analysis of this topic.
Put another way, when we consider cases before 1978, the term (Q m it =Q it )T it I t disappears given that I t = 0.
Therefore, the export volume simply equals the agricultural export volume.
Data and Empirical Results
In this section, we …rst describe the data sets used in the analysis followed by a presentation of our benchmark empirical results. To control for the endogeneity problem, we then o¤er an analysis of the validity of the instruments. Finally, we close the section with a discussion of China's economy in di¤erent periods.
To estimate (19), we need data on urban agricultural consumption (C it ), total export (T it ), aggregate wages (W it ), province-level manufacturing output (Q m it ), total output (Q it ), and price elasticity of wages ( ). As mentioned above, data on price elasticity of wages are unavailable but the magnitudes can be estimated instead. Data on China's exports in our sample are converted from US dollars to Chinese Yuan using the spot o¢ cial exchange rates. In addition, we choose 1950 as the base year for the relative price index. [Insert Table 2 Here]
Benchmark Estimates
Following (17), we …rst run the …xed-e¤ect estimations for di¤erent time periods. It turns out that the relative price elasticity of wages is 0:083 for the whole period though statistically insigni…cant. The economic rationale is straightforward. The lower the agricultural relative price is, the higher the urban wage is. Note that the lower agricultural relative price implies a larger price scissors. When the government imposes a strong price e¤ect on peasants, urban workers'real income will increase relatively since they consume necessary goods at a very low cost.
As shown in Table 2 , the coe¢ cients on the agricultural relative price elasticity of wages are all negative. Most of them are statistically signi…cant except for period 1978-1984. It is not a surprise to have measurement errors for such estimated magnitudes given that we have no idea about the "true" reduced-form speci…cation of the e¤ect of prices on wages. But, as mentioned above, we can address this problem by using the instrumental variables approach.
Our benchmark OLS estimation results of Speci…cation (19) are reported in Column (1) of Table 3 . The coe¢ cient of urban agricultural consumption,^ 1 , is 0:01 but statistically insigni…cant. Correspondingly, the coe¢ cient of the product of the price elasticity and the urban wages,^ 2 , is 19:58. After controlling for the province-speci…c and year-speci…c …xed e¤ects in Column (3), the coe¢ cient of^ 1 changes to be signi…cant.
Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables
The endogeneity problem of Speci…cation (19) could come from measurement errors in the price elasticity. As mentioned above, we do not have data on agricultural relative price elasticity of wages. Instead we use the OLS estimated coe¢ cient obtained from Speci…cation (17) . It is natural to suspect that there are measurement errors between the estimated elasticity coe¢ cient and the "true" inaccessible data.
To identify the accurate weights in the government's objective function, we needs to control for the endogeneity problem. Otherwise, the related estimates would be suspect. A powerful econometric technique to address the endogeneity is to perform two-stage generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations by adopting appropriate instrumental variables. Note that the equilibrium condition (13) implies no causal relationship among each variable. Therefore, the GMM estimation is an ideal approach. Moreover, GMM requires fewer assumptions on the error term and has the ability to generate heteroscedasticityrobust standard errors as compared to the general least squares method (Hall, 2004 ).
We use investment in capital construction and …xed-asset investment in innovation as In short, all of these statistical tests give us su¢ cient con…dence that the instruments perform well, and, therefore, the speci…cation is valid.
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Finally, we provide an easy-to-interpret version for the validity of the instrument. We add both the …xed-asset investment in innovation and the investment in capital construction as exogenous regressors. If these two variables have a direct e¤ect on agricultural net exports, then we would expect the estimated coe¢ cients to be statistically signi…cant.
However, as shown in the last column of Table 3 , they are statistically insigni…cant at the 5% level. 11 This again a¢ rms that these two variables a¤ect the regressand through and only through the channel of the instrumented variables.
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 show the estimation results using the IV approach. The IV estimation results are broadly consistent with those from the OLS estimates. Column (4) reports the …xed-e¤ect IV estimates. The coe¢ cients for the two key variables, T it and W it , are statistically signi…cant and very close to those in the FE estimates in Column (3).
Robustness Checks
China su¤ered from a country-wide famine that lasted for around three years during 1959-1961. We wonder if China's government adjusted the objective function when it faced this a negative shock. In Table 4 , we add one more control variable, dummy of famine (i.e., equals to one for years 1959-1961 and zero otherwise), to check if our estimation results reported in Table 3 are robust. After controlling for the two-way …xed e¤ects, the coe¢ cients of all variables are very close to those in Table 3 . In addition, the famine had a negative e¤ect, though insigni…cant, on lowering urban agricultural consumption. Such a …nding is also broadly consistent with China's reality during that period.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
We have already explored the heterogeneity of the price index in di¤erent periods.
Similarly, China's trade pattern has changed over the years. Before 1978, the year that China began its economic reforms, the components of China's foreign trade were relatively simple. The openness ratio (i.e., the sum of exports and imports relative to the GDP) was only around 5%. Most of China's exportable goods were agricultural products (Naughton, 2005) . In the late 1970s, China also began to export oil because the petroleum production Given that China's economy structure was quite di¤erent before and after 1978, we …rst split our sample spread into two di¤erent periods using 1978 as a cut-o¤ year. We also take 1985 as another cut-o¤ point since the economic reforms before and after 1985 were quite di¤erent as introduced above. Table 5 reports the estimation results for 1978-1992 by using precise province-level agricultural export data. 13 Various econometric approaches suggest that urban agricultural consumption is positively correlated with agricultural exports, but negatively correlated with the product of wages and price elasticity. The two key coe¢ cients,^ 1 and^ 2 , are statistically signi…cant in all speci…cations. The magnitude of 2 is much lower than its counterpart for the whole period, 1949-1992. Column (5) provides an easy-to-intrepret version on the validity of the instruments during the 1978-1992 period.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
We go further to specify the period after 1978 into two sub-periods: 1978-1984 and 1985-1992. We report the estimation results in the lower parts of Table 6 . The signs of the two key coe¢ cients are consistent with those in Table 5 . Most of the estimates are signi…cant. The only exception is the coe¢ cient^ 1 during the period 1978-1984 in the IV …xed-e¤ect estimations, which is discussed below.
[Insert Table 6 Here]
Weights Identi…cation
Based on the estimation results obtained from Tables 4-6 , we are ready to retrieve the weights in the government's objective function. We normalize the weight of the agricultural sector as a unity in (10) . Accordingly, the relative weight of the manufacturing sector is in the government's objective function. measures the relative weight of investment relative to consumption. By comparing (18) to (19), we can precisely identify the magnitudes of the weights: = 1=^ 1 + 1and = (1 ^ 2 )=^ 1 + 1. We are therefore able to retrieve these weights once the estimates of both and are statistically signi…cant.
The results on the weights are presented in Table 7 . We …rst report the weights when estimated without controlling for endogeneity and the …xed-e¤ect speci…cation. As seen in the top section in Table 7 , the OLS estimates suggest that the relative weight for urban workers is insigni…cant. The calculated weights from the OLS estimates indeed have some bias due to the endogeneity problem. Hence, we go a step further to calculate the relative weights in the government's objective function after controlling for endogeneity.
The two coe¢ cients are signi…cant in the IV …xed-e¤ect estimate, which suggests that the weight for urban workers is 39:5 while the weight for future investment is 945:2. The strikingly high number is beyond our expectations, 14 but its implication is very clear: the welfare of urban workers was more important than that of peasants in the view of China's government during the planned economy era. China's government also cared more about investment than about consumption. In addition, the weight for investment is much larger than the weight for workers. We therefore conclude that China's government paid much more attention to investment than to workers during 1949-1992.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
We expect that things were di¤erent before and after 1978. Before the economic reforms, the primary objective of China's government was to develop its heavy industries so that China could catch up with the advanced countries like the U.S. and the U.K. as soon as possible (Lin, Cai, and Li, 1994) . But, since the reforms in 1978, the government has paid more attention to improving citizens'living standard. In other words, government has cared less about investments and more about consumption since the economic reforms began. Our estimation results provide evidence to support this dynamic change. As seen in the middle section of Table 7 , the IV …xed-e¤ect estimates suggest that, during the 1978-1992 period, China still paid more attention to investments than to consumption ( = 8:26). It also cared about urban workers more than about rural peasants ( = 8:25).
However, the magnitudes of these two weights shrank dramatically compared to those before 1978.
The bottom section of Table 7 Indeed, its reform logic was usually described as "crossing the river by groping for the stone".
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Concluding Remarks
Fully guided by a theoretical model introduced by S-S(1984), in the present paper, we estimate the structural parameters in the government's objective function of China. We …nd that the weight attached to the welfare of workers is much higher than that to the welfare of peasants. Furthermore, the government also paid much more attention to future investment than to current consumption. Overall, our estimates suggest that an augmented version of S-S's (1984) model …ts China's reality quite well, and it is also useful in explaining the magnitude of political consideration in the government's mind.
Like other structural parameter estimates, our estimates enjoy several advantages.
First, since our estimates closely depend on a theoretical model, we are able to see the connection of each structural variable. Second, the structural parameter estimates are also helpful in avoiding the arbitrage speci…cations that commonly occur in reduced-form estimates. The economic meaning of each corresponding estimated coe¢ cient is also clear.
The magnitudes of the structural variables in our speci…cation are not only statistically but also economically signi…cant.
Our study also has implications for China. Although the phenomenon of using price
scissors against peasants o¢ cially ended in the early 1990s. China's government still maintains various price controls in some areas. The manipulated exchange rate policy is an excellent example. It is true that today's price controls di¤er from the price scissors used against peasants, but, in essence, the economic meaning behind these policies is, to some extent, similar in terms of the government's political concern.
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As in any ambitious attempt to marry a complicated structural parameters model to imperfect data, we have made a variety of compromises here. Since we do not have disaggregated data on province-level agricultural exports before 1978, we use a proxy or estimated value as a substitute. Clearly, it would be better to use the "actual" data to estimate the government's objective function in China, which could be a possible avenue for future research.
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Appendix A From (11), we know that
To determine the optimal terms of trade against peasants, we take the partial derivative of the government's social welfare function, , with respect to p, and set it zero: d dp = @ @p + @ @w dw dp
dw dp N m L m dw dp
where the second equality is from (4) and (7). The third equality rearranges the term N m x m , the fourth equality is from (8) and de…nes the price elasticity of wages as (dw=dp) p=w. Finally, we multiple p on both sides to obtain Speci…cation (13):
Appendix Value of agricultural exports in province i in year t:
Value of total exports, which is the sum of agricultural and manufacturing exports given
Value of agricultural export which equals
Total output level of province i in year t Q m it Output level of manufacturing products in province i in year t C it Agricultural consumption from urban workers,
Province-speci…c …xed e¤ects for Speci…cation (16) Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t-value. **(*) denotes signi…cance at 1 (5)% respectively. Provincespeci…c and year-speci…c …xed e¤ects are not reported here to save space, though they are available upon request. 
